

EAVA-4421

Chief, EE
Attn:
Chief of Mission, Austria

6. Oct. 1953

Operational/GRBOUNCE/GROOVY

Program for Preparation for Wartime Operational Activity
in Austria

REFS: A. EAVA-3856, 27 August 1953

B. EAVA-4042, 28 August 1953

INFO: Chief of Base, Salzburg
Attn:
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File | PM Reports

Background:

1. Reevaluation of present paramilitary and stay-behind operations and the paramilitary program for Austria (as expressed formally in the Austrian Country Plan, plus revisions thereof) has been in progress in the field for several months. In April 1953, an analysis was prepared in draft form for review and criticism by Mission officers responsible for PM activity, including personnel who have subsequently departed the Mission,
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and these comments and may be said to represent a distillation of the combined experience and judgment of all qualified field officers, including many who have been engaged in KUBARK Austrian PM and stay-behind activity since its inception.
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2. The approach employed in this reevaluation has been to analyze our past experience and to determine what modifications in existing projects are required, and what new activities can and should be undertaken in the general field of preparations for wartime operations. The result is, in our opinion, a new program under which the maximum possible number of operational assets for wartime use will be developed securely during peacetime, both in satisfaction of specific requirements set forth by the military and of objectives felt by the Austrian Mission to be regarding from the standpoint of eventual conduct of covert operations in wartime. We have attempted to retain maximum flexibility in outlining this program, since there are areas in which the military requirements have not as yet been specified (for example, Evasion and Escape). The receipt during August 1953 of SHAPE and US EUCOM unconventional warfare requirements has demonstrated very clearly the need for flexibility; with the exception of a requirement for a guerrilla area in the Hochschwab, the SHAPE and US EUCOM requirements do not coincide with the operations we have developed to date. We shall have to carry out a major shift in our operational emphasis to meet even a portion of these requirements, a contingency which it is hoped this program will avoid in the future.

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3. Possibly the most distinctive feature of this program is in its shift away from "group" operations, except insofar as existing operational commitments necessitate the maintenance of relations with FM groups (and with the notable exception of GRDAGGER, which, for reasons explained below, we believe continues to offer genuine potential). By "group" operations, we mean those undertaken with indigenous persons in which the size, structure and degree of independence of the group serve to reduce the elements of KUBARK control to general guidance, liaison and material support; the chief example on the local scene is, of course, ORLAUNCH. This disillusionment with group operations stems partly from our own experience and partly from KUHOCK experience in other areas, and is based specifically on the following considerations:

a. As a group expands in size (which it almost inevitably does and to an increasingly uncontrolled degree as its membership grows), knowledge of its existence spreads among an ever wider circle of people. This expansion of the circle of knowledgeable persons correspondingly seriously reduces the possibility that the group will be able to survive enemy invasion at the same time it increases the possibility of "flaps" during the peacetime period.

b. Case officer control over the operation is dissipated as the group grows, especially since the Principal Agent's control itself is weakened the more persons he has under him in a covert relationship. This is, of course, less true in the case of GRDAGGER, where the Principal Agent's control is founded chiefly on the overt and not the covert organizational structure.

c. Group operations are invariably more costly in material and effort than operations involving individual agents or tightly-controlled nuclei; in the event of a flap or hostile penetration, which is more likely to occur in the case of a group, the loss is consequently the greater.

d. The one chief advantage which a group might seem to offer, i.e., that of being able to become operational much more rapidly after D-Day than would an individual leader or small nucleus, is considered illusory. In actuality, it does not seem probable that a group would be willing or able to undertake group action in the offensive sense until such time as circumstances, possibly only the approach of overt Allied military forces, make such action a "reasonable risk."

4. We suggest that this program, or such portions of it in which Washington concurs, be incorporated into the objectives of GRCROOND by a formal amendment to that project. The revised GRCROOND would thus provide the formal statement of approved objectives for the Austrian FM program, sufficient flexibility with regard to the operational means by which these objectives are to be attained to permit ready adaptation by the field to new developments, and the financial and material support required for their attainment. It is requested that earliest possible advice be transmitted to us regarding Washington reaction to our proposals.

Program -- Current Operations

5. GRDAGGER:

a. For the present, PM activity under this project, now that the supplementary caching program has been completed, will be restricted to W/T training of certain subordinate agents and further planning discussions with the Principal Agent. Earliest possible clarification is required with regard to PM training for selected group members, including weapons familiarization and firing, use of demolitions, use of specialized sabotage devices, employment of air navigational aids (for assisting bombing raids and guiding air drops), and PM theory and tactics. The priority of this problem stems not only from a moral commitment given the Principal Agent, at the time we first undertook PM discussions with him, that we would train a small group of his subordinate agents, but far more importantly from our belief that without such training, the wartime effectiveness of GRDAGGER will be greatly impaired. We feel that with proper security precautions, the risks in conducting training will be kept at a reasonable level.

b. Another factor influencing our thinking with regard to GRDAGGER PM training is that we foresee little likelihood of satisfying military U/W requirements, even in part, except through the use of this organization's potential in the Soviet Zone of Austria. The military U/W requirements call for guerrilla forces areas in two places, the Hochschwab (already planned for under GRDAGGER) and the Greiner Wald, 40 miles NE of Linz; in this latter area, it appears to be a question of GRDAGGER or probably nothing. These U/W requirements also include a number of sabotage, attack and assistance targets in Soviet Zone locations; while it is possible that we may be able to develop individual agents for operations against these targets, given sufficient time, it is far more likely that we shall have to depend very largely on GRDAGGER for whatever operations are carried out against them. The nature of the SHAPE and US EUCOM requirements in effect makes GRDAGGER loom all the more largely in our PM picture, but our utilization of the GRDAGGER organization for stay-behind work especially calls for a broadening of our relationship with the Principal Agent in this field, during which he will quite naturally renew his demands for training of a nucleus of his personnel in PM subjects. We consider it unlikely that it will be possible to reach satisfactory agreement with the Principal Agent regarding operational exploitation of elements of the GRDAGGER organization who will stay behind in the Soviet Zone (and we feel quite sure that he will have such personnel for his own purposes), until we have met his reasonable training requirements.

c. The solution to the training problem appears to be dependent on military cooperation in two respects, securing agreement of all authorities concerned to a policy which recognizes and assumes the political risks in giving PM training to members of an organization which has its own ulterior political aspirations, and placing at KUBARK disposal the training sites, materials and instructors which will be required for the carrying out of

a practical training program. The question of the willingness of the military to grant this cooperation has already been posed in the submission to the SWPE of the U/W requirements; we shall continue to explore it through the appropriate war plans channels in the field.

d. Our confidence with respect to GRDAGGER, as opposed to other PM groups, is based on its special qualities. The Principal Agent's organization has a completely valid peacetime raison d'être, a cordial relationship with powerful elements in the Government, and a legitimate anti-Communist which provides motivation and "cover" for much of the work done in KUBARK interest. Moreover, the Principal Agent has strong political reasons for desiring to make a name for himself as a resistance leader if war should come. The likelihood of his living up to his commitments to us, therefore, appears quite considerable.

6. GRIALUNCH:

It is not necessary to elaborate here on the proposals regarding future direction of this project which were set forth in EASA-1543, 21 June 1953, as well as in Reference B. In essence, we consider GRIALUNCH at best a contingent asset. It is conceivable that a few GRIALUNCH agents might become available in wartime for use as individual agents; if so, we shall use them, but we shall not count on their availability at all during the prewar phase. We shall continue our relationship with the Principal Agent for some time so as to clear up loose ends and monitor future developments.

7. Evacuation and Escape:

a. GRBLAMED:

Continuing the project along the lines already planned, we shall nonetheless hold recruitment down to the minimum, since it has already gone somewhat further than we would feel desirable under our present operational doctrine. We hope ultimately to recruit one individual agent in the GRBLAMED area, kept separate from this project, as insurance against possible immediate roll-up of the GRBLAMED net following enemy occupation.

b. GRREFAIR:

This is in fact an individual agent, and not a group project. No further recruitments in addition to the Principal Agent are planned for the foreseeable future; operational activity is limited to training of the Principal Agent and spotting and vetting of prospective wartime agents.

c. GRPIGLET/GRGIVING:

Our detailed comments on the present status of these two projects are contained in Paragraph 4 d. (1) of Reference B. In effect, we

have one full trained and fairly satisfactory W/T operator in ORGIVING 1 and an almost useless "Principal Agent" in ORPIGLET 1. We may be able to get some further spotting and survey service out of the latter, but our only solution to genuine progress on the Vienna to Kieflau E & E line is to recruit one or more new Principal Agent organizers.

Program -- New Operations

8. New operations under this program will be restricted to individual agent or "nucleus" operations. An example of what is meant by a nucleus-type operation would be an E & E project under which a Principal Agent organizer, scheduled for evacuation prior to or at the outbreak of war, would recruit and train sub-organizers and, if possible, W/T operators as well. Each of the subordinate agents would be unknown to the others and would have, as his sole prewar occupations, his own training and spotting (for vetting and cording) for his wartime collaborators. It is felt that such operations will provide for maximum efficiency in the development of the E & E organization, while still preserving the requisite degree of security.

9. Included among the individual agent operations which we shall develop are the following types:

a. ICEBERG: Because the ICEBERG program is a special field of its own, it is being made the subject of a special dispatch now under preparation. We shall carry out ICEBERG and other stay-behind operations on a coordinated basis (see paragraph 9 b below), so as to derive maximum benefit from our operational effort. There is fundamentally no limitation, except those imposed by practical difficulties (spotting problems, numbers of training personnel and sites), on the number of stay-behind W/T operators which should be developed in Austria. As Washington is aware, ICEBERG at VOB has been made the staff responsibility of [redacted] This, together with increased emphasis on spotting by all operational personnel and the steps being taken at SOB to intensify the ICEBERG program there, should result in gradual acceleration of this important effort.

b. Stay-behind Leaders:

(1) We believe that a singularly valuable activity will be the development of stay-behind "leadership type" agents, similar to ICEBERG agents, but of even higher caliber. These are individual agents who appear reasonably likely to be able to remain in place during wartime and who possess leadership qualities in sufficient degree to render them suitable for the postwar organization of E & E nets, sabotage teams, guerrilla units, or intelligence nets. We will seek to recruit such agents in a variety of locations, including Vienna, Linz, Salzburg, and the urban areas of eastern Austria. An important qualification in the selection of such agents will be relative flexibility and mobility during the training phase, so as to permit extensive and detailed coverage of all subjects.

(2) Training for such leader agents will include tradecraft, intelligence reporting and W/T as a minimum (special aspects of W/T training are treated in detail below). As time permits, we shall also provide training in more specialized subjects, the choice of subjects being dependent upon the character of the agent in question, including E & E theory and organization; clandestine communications, including S/W; guerrilla organization and tactics; sabotage techniques; air navigational assistance, visual and electronic; and practical field training in arms and demolitions. In addition, promising agents in this category might be provided funds for taking specialized training available overtly, foreign languages, operation of motor vehicles, etc. All of this supplementary training would, of course, be keyed to the agent himself; an agent especially interested in E & E, for example, might be given intensive training in that to the exclusion of such subjects as guerrilla warfare and sabotage.

(3) In view of existing KUGLUB policy, it is felt that the question of W/T training for such agents must be discussed in detail at Headquarters. As soon as initial assessment is over, W/T training would commence. During the course of W/T training, we will gain a reasonably sound evaluation of the agent as a person and an operative. If it becomes clear that our hopes for his leadership qualities were over-optimistic, we can concentrate on W/T and basic tradecraft and satisfy ourselves with making the agent a stay-behind operator in the usual sense of the term. If it is clear that he is actually a leader, however, we feel that the W/T training will serve the following useful purposes, even though the agent's wartime mission will encompass things far beyond the limitations of W/T:

(a) It will enable the agent to establish contact with base initially, even if it proves impossible to furnish him a W/T operator (either native or U.S.), or in the event that his W/T operator is lost.

(b) It will enable him to train his own operator in the event we are unable to furnish one.

(c) It will enable the agent to deliver his messages to his operator already encoded, and to receive them the same way; this will materially enhance the security of the entire operation.

(d) It will enable the agent to monitor the activity of his operator, in case he has doubts about the latter's efficiency or loyalty.

(e) It will furnish the agent a far better understanding of the limitations of W/T communications and the problems under which his operator will be laboring.

(4) It is stressed that in our operational concept of the leader agent, we fully appreciate that it is neither secure nor efficient to attempt to combine the Principal Agent and W/T operator functions in one person. W/T operation under wartime stay-behind conditions will normally be so difficult and time-consuming as to preclude the operator's engaging in additional responsibilities and duties. The agent's ability to establish contact with base without a second person as operator or to train his own operator to transmit and receive (since the agent will be able to do his own encoding, cryptographic training for such an operator would not be necessary), however, appears vital, in terms of the over-all investment we shall have put into such an agent, to warrant his being given W/T training and equipment during the prewar phase.

(5) The following SOP will govern the program for selection, recruitment and training of leader agents:

(a) Especially careful selection, W/T assessment, and continuing evaluation of the candidate for motivation, background, intelligence and psychological stamina.

(b) No linking up of a leader agent with any other agent personnel during the prewar phase.

(c) Training of the agent along lines appropriate for his background, characteristics and, insofar as possible, personal interests. All such agents, however, to receive basic tradecraft, intelligence reporting and W/T training.

(d) Firm recognition, safety and danger signals and normal, alternate and emergency meeting arrangements to be worked out in detail and provided the agent for wartime use; this will ensure our ability to contact him even without W/T communications.

(e) Spotting, checking and carding of all persons with whom the leader agent believes he may work during war.

(f) Appropriate caching to be carried out when the candidate has proven his worth in training, so as to ensure that at least a minimum quantity of useful equipment is available for him when war breaks out (such a cache would include at least one sidearm and ammunition and some money; W/T equipment, crystals and signal plans would be cached as for any W/T agent).

(6) With respect to the recruitment and training of leader agents, it is of course not our intention to advise such an agent of the full extent of our hopes for his development until we are reasonably certain he can make the grade. Initially, we should describe our goal as that

of general stay-behind activity, with emphasis on W/T. If the agent proves to lack the capacity for higher development, we shall not then be in the position of having to indicate to him that he has fallen short of our expectations.

c. Stay-behind Support Agents:

We will also spot, check and card as many stay-behind support agents as possible. In some cases, we may actually wish to clear and recruit, in order to make occasional contact, offer some material compensation, and reach agreement on meeting arrangements and recognition signals for use by a wartime contact; as the exception, we may even wish to give some training to certain of these agents. Our basic aim, however, will be to locate, check and record people to whom our action agents might safely turn in wartime for such support as foods, shelter, medical care, livedrop service and courier duties.

10. We propose also to undertake a number of operational support activities, using both staff and agent personnel for their accomplishment, as follows:

a. Spotting and recording operational facilities for wartime use, especially meeting places and dead drops. Our aim will be to make ready the kind of operational data which can be procured with relative ease during the time when the U.S. controls a portion of the area and can operate into these portions under hostile control, but which would be extremely difficult to secure once we have been forced out. Although no limits can be set on the specific locations which might profitably be covered by such activity, we shall concentrate initially on Vienna, Salzburg and Linz. Agent personnel should be used to the maximum extent for this work, although the preparation of finished operational briefing folders will have to be accomplished by staff personnel. These folders will ultimately contain most or all of the following materials:

- (1) Large and small scale maps and photographs of the area.
- (2) Guidebooks and other descriptive literature.
- (3) Street directories, telephone books and address books.
- (4) Transportation schedules, descriptions of routes, and route maps.
- (5) Miscellaneous overt publications, such as Who's Who, trade, industrial, finance and official directories, etc.
- (6) Overt background material, works on local history, dialects, biographical materials, etc.

(7) Samples of local commodities, currency, tickets of various sorts, newspapers, periodicals, menus, etc.

(8) Photographs of buildings, local apparel, facilities, etc.

(9) Staff studies and analyses of matters of probable operational significance, including popular customs, tabus, local holidays, pastimes, tastes, etc.

(10) Detailed descriptions, including maps and photographs, of suitable operational facilities, drops, meeting places, and possible sites for wartime caching.

(11) Complete and accurate briefing regarding all cache sites used in the area.

a. These folders will be transmitted to Headquarters in installments, to be retained there for the wartime use of agents dropped or infiltrated into Austria. Agents will be used to the maximum extent possible for collection of material and spotting and photographing of potential facilities, staff personnel for the collation of collected material and preparation of the final folders. Following completion of collection activities against the principal cities, the effort will be directed against the next largest urban areas of the Soviet Zone, Baden, Wiener Neustadt, St. Pölten, etc.

c. Spotting and charting of landing and drop zones throughout Austria. SOB has taken the initiative in this aspect of the program, and existing operational requirements are being taken into full account. The IZ-DZ spotting is being carried out by staff members, with the assistance of GROILBIRD.

d. Caching by staff members of small quantities of arms, money, barter items and medical kits in both underground and building locations. Quantities of materials cached would be limited (the usual cache would probably contain a weapon, ammunition and other items sufficient for one man at a modest rate of operational activity), and the caches could probably be carried out under the guise of such recreational activity as gardening, home repairs, hikes and picnics. Chance discovery of such caches would involve little financial loss or security risk, provided the caching operation had been well executed. A detailed description of the cache site would be prepared, along the standard lines, and incorporated into the operational briefing folder for the area concerned.

e. Recovery of military caches laid down in 1951 and 1952, for the purpose of ascertaining condition, repacking so as to avoid deterioration, and caching of the repacked materials. One 1951 cache recently recovered by SOB, which is now preparing a detailed report on the subject, showed serious deterioration in some of its elements because of water leakage. It is apparent that faults in the outer wrapping of the packing boxes was

